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Article 7

THE JUDGMENT
OF THE DRAWING
ROOM
Kristin Flieger
Samuelian
Enlightened Sentiments: Judgment
and Autonomy in the Age of
Sensibility by Hina Nazar. New
York: Fordham University Press,
2012. Pp. 192. $45.00 cloth.

In Enlightened Sentiments, Hina
Nazar shows how Enlightenment
rationalism is involved with sentimentalism, and how that involvement is embedded within Romantic
fiction. Sentimentalism, located
philosophically with David Hume
and Adam Smith and fictively with
novelists as differently positioned
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jane
Austen, is “mutually engaged”
with rationalism “in an ongoing
liberal project that seeks normative underpinnings for a postmetaphysical age” (3). Nazar grounds
her argument in a delineation of an
autonomous judgment that is fundamentally social, enacted through
the epistolarity of mid-century novels and within the drawing rooms
of Austen’s domestic fiction. The
“social constitution of subjectivity” (4) aligns sentimentalism with
Kantian rationalism through their
shared use of an “aesthetic analogy
for moral judgment” (5): characters
in novels judge others and their
own hearts by using the same rules
and standards by which they judge
landscapes, artworks, poems.
Nazar establishes the framework for her argument in the first
two chapters, which outline the
“rhetoric of spectatorship” (12) that
informs philosophical and novelistic sentimentalism. Spectatorship
links aesthetic and moral judgment
to “an understanding of individuals as socially embedded subjects,
whose ability to question the norms
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of their societies and to constitute
alternative principles of action
requires active social engagement
in the form of critical debate” (16).
The “claims of the subject” in sentimentalism and Kantian aesthetics
share space with the claims “of context” (58). In chapter 3, “Judging
Clarissa’s Heart,” Nazar points
out that Samuel Richardson’s epistolary structure cooperates with
Clarissa’s (1748) trope of spectatorship to enforce the sociability of
judgment. Throughout the novel,
until her death and martyrdom,
Clarissa “insistently questions her
heart’s authority” (61), installing herself as both spectator and
judge. Her understanding of herself “as her heart’s observer rather
than its blind disciple” emerges in
her injunctions to her friend and
correspondent Anna to “‘lay [her]
heart open,’ as though it were a
book that could be placed on a lectern, or some other object for joint
viewing” (64).
In its formal structure as much
as its plotting, Richardson’s novel
insists on an “other-directedness
of judgment” (52) that derives
from David Hume and Immanuel
Kant. Through her letters, Clarissa
“socialize[s]” the “paradigm of
judgment” (62). Correspondence
enables her to receive “readers’
reports on her self-representation”
(67)—a departure from the Puritan
diarists whose rigorous self-scrutiny
constitutes them as her most obvious formal forebears. Epistolarity

articulates inward judgment but
upends its infallibility. Through
Clarissa’s insistence that self-
examination is a social act, fully realized only in exchange, Richardson
“opens up an ethical understanding that pivots around standpoints
rather than standards, and that
identifies the social world to be
an ineluctably perspectival public
space” (79).
In “A Sentimental Education:
Rousseau to Godwin,” Nazar reads
Rousseau’s Julie, ou la nouvelle
Héloise (Julie, or the New Heloise,
1761), as one of Clarissa’s immediate heirs. Inheritance is a key critical trope in Enlightened Sentiments:
the legacy of “moral self-direction”
(1) passes from Clarissa to Julie
to Henry Mackenzie’s Julia de
Roubigné (1777) to William
Godwin’s Fleetwood (1805) to “the
writings of one of sentimentalism’s
most important literary heirs”:
Austen (115). But, like the plots of
so many sentimental novels, literary
heritability is never straightforward:
every generation, as Mary Crawford
remarks in Mansfield Park (1814),
“has its improvements.” In Julie,
“Rousseau seeks to revise Clarissa
into a Bildungsroman of the passions, to show how the love of two
people of refined sensibilities . . .
lends itself to affiliation with virtue”
(82). But by the novel’s conclusion,
which leaves St. Preux as an intellectually free ascetic and Julie as
both bourgeois matron and willing sacrifice, it has become “simply

ON ENLIGHTENED SENTIMENTS
a narrative of replacing obedience
with obedience” (91).
Mackenzie and Godwin set
out to correct the patriarchalism
that erases Julie from Rousseau’s
narrative—one with tragic overlay, one with liberal corrective. In
Julia, Mackenzie returns to the
female community that constituted the sociability of judgment
for Richardson, but establishes its
fragility through a weakened epistolary frame, “attenuated” toward
century’s end “by the growing
internal differentiation of modern
society” (100–101), and in the face
of the commodification implicit in
an Othello-like plot of “imagined
infidelity and jealous rage” (98). In
Fleetwood, Godwin offers “the monstrous progeny of a Rousseauvian
education” (106). Fleetwood’s sensibility lacks “
perspective-making
contact with a broad spectrum of
other standpoints” (109), and his
unchecked egoism militates against
the companionate union that is the
dream of sentimental fiction. The
second chance afforded him at the
novel’s conclusion places Fleetwood
“at a critical juncture between sentimental tragedy and the comic resolutions of many nineteenth-century
realist novels” (115), bridging the
generation gap between Rousseau
and Austen.
In “Judgment, Propriety, and
the Critique of Sensibility: The
‘Sentimental’ Jane Austen,” Nazar
reworks the official story of Austen’s
reverence for Richardson (quotes
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from family memoirs attesting
to her Richardsonian taste and
knowledge head the chapter) to
offer this novel as a kind of readout of all the elements that link
Richardson equally with Humean
sentiment and Kantian aesthetics. Austen’s first published novel,
and one that was begun in the last
decade of the eighteenth century,
Sense and Sensibility (1811) follows in the line of descent from
Richardson through Mackenzie
and Godwin. It also looks, as many
readers have noted, like an explicit
critique of sentimentalism, and
Nazar devotes some time to the
antisentimentalist take on Austen,
most often lodged in her two earliest written novels, surveying
critics from Walter Scott and Ian
Watt to Marilyn Butler and Clara
Tuite. Rather than focusing on the
instability of Austen’s oppositions,
however, the “broadly history-ofideas” context for Nazar’s reading
offers the tension between the two
Dashwood sisters rather as a “family quarrel within sentimentalism”
(9). Both, she argues, “take judgment and feeling to be inextricably
intertwined” (121). The difference
lies in one sister’s commitment to
judging within rather than against
the social world. In the end, for
Nazar, Austen’s novel highlights
the difficulties of judging “in a
world in which established rules
have lost authority” (123). This is
the world of Clarissa, but it’s also
the world of all Austen novels, in
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which heroines cannot depend on
traditional hierarchical structures.
The Dashwoods employ aesthetic
criteria as a means of judging character. (Nazar points out that both
sisters value connoisseurship in a
potential lover.) But Elinor’s “cultivated impartiality” contrasts with
Marianne’s Fleetwood-like narcissism and isolationism in being
“highly compatible with the norms
of politeness” (136).
Throughout this chapter, Nazar
signals a canny recognition of
Austen’s status as a novelist so
beloved she becomes a malleable
character all her own. In a neat
reworking of yet another favorite
biographical detail, she connects
Elinor’s ability to muse over her
own faithless lover without shutting
herself up in her room to Austen’s
reputed habit of writing her fiction in the family drawing room.
Both indicate “a liberty of mind or
thought that is operative even in the
presence of others” (142). Austen’s
drawing-room settings, in other
words—both within her novels and
in the stories of their production—
emphasize not the impossibility but
the sociability of reverie. Moreover,
she recognizes that the drawing
room, like the salon of a different

era and continent, is a gendered
space. Highlighting “the domestic
woman’s fitness for critical thinking and public participation” (144),
it “is the place where middle-class
women like Austen’s heroines and
Jane Austen herself stepped into a
larger world” (146).
Nazar’s readings of these novels,
and of the complex philosophical
history that informs them, are uniformly rigorous, thoughtful, and
illuminating. Her conclusion—that
“by casting her light on the drawing
room, Austen places the norm of a
common point of view at the center
of a nineteenth-century tradition of
fiction that builds on eighteenthcentury sentimentalism and aesthetics” (146)—makes Enlightened
Sentiments not just an engaged work
of literary criticism but an important interlocutor for other scholars
of emergent domestic realism.
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